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Hiaring: Fish or Fowl?

FISH OR FOWL?
THE NATURE OF WTO DISPUTE
RESOLUTION UNDER TRIPS

ANNE HIARING*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This note discusses the procedure of dispute resolution in the World
Trade Organization (WTO). The note goes on to discuss WTO disputes
involving intellectual property to date and the possible impacts of the
WTO dispute resolution procedures on the determination of substantive
issues of intellectual property law, using dispute WS 160 ~nvolving the
Fairness in Music Licensing Act, as an example.
The note concludes that the same concerns about lack of due process and
inability of amici to appear in the proceedings that cause concern in the
environmental field are also causes of concern with respect to intellectual
property rights determinations. Lawyers trained in the negotiation of
trade disputes with no background in intellectual property are determining important issues on intellectual property rights protection, with no
guarantee of the participation of fair use or other civil society advocates,
nor the ability of developing nations with fewer resources to make their
voices heard in these proceedings.

* Anne Hiaring has been practicing copyright and trademark law since 1980. She has served
as an Adjunct Professor of intellectual property at Golden Gate University in San Francisco since
1990, and in Bangkok, Thailand, since 1998. She is a LLM International Law candidate at Golden
Gate University.
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THE TRIPS PROVISIONS OF THE WORLD TRADE
AGREEMENT

By way of background, at the time the WTO was created, effective January 1995, the TRIPS annex (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property) to the WTO also went into effect, creating binding obligations
among member nations to comply with TRIPS provisions. TRIPS requires that certain minimum standards of intellectual property protection
be provided, as well as that the intellectual property law rights of nonnationals be treated the same as those of nationals. Also part of the
WTO is a dispute settlement procedure that enables member nations to
resolve disputes about whether or not a member is actually complying
with its obligations under the WTO agreements. These dispute resolution procedures therefore also apply to disputes involving compliance
with obligations under TRIPS.
It bears focusing upon the purpose of the WTO - to reduce barriers to
trade and to promote free trade. The question must also be asked what
promoting free trade has to do with the protection of intellectual property, and whether the goal of promoting free trade falls short of furthering all of the public policy interests underlying intellectual property law
protection.
The Agreement that established the WTO has a key purpose to reduce
"tariffs and other barriers to trade and to ... [eliminate] discriminatory
treatment in international trade relations. "1 The preamble to TRIPS provides:
"Members,
Desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade ...
Hereby agree as follows: ..... " 2

1.
2.
Rights.

Preamble to Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
Preamble to Annex Ie Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellecual Property
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Thus the goal of the WTO Agreement is to reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade, the goal of TRIPS is to "reduce distortions and impediments
to international trade" (presumably existing if certain intellectual property norms are not met) and the entire minimum standards in TRIPS are,
by definition "trade related intellectual property issues." Therefore when
disputes under TRIPS are determined by the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB), the ultimate determination is whether or not a law or policy
of a member state creates a "distortion or impediment to trade." This is
interesting because historically, intellectual property rights protection
was not viewed as a matter of promoting trade, but of furthering the public policy and private rights underlying the reason for these laws to begin
with. It is against this backdrop that the actual mechanisms of the dispute resolution system must be considered.
III.

HOW DISPUTES ARE SETTLED IN THE WTO

The dispute resolution system provided in the WTO creates a government-to-government complaint and review mechanism where trade disputes over compliance with the WTO Agreement can be decided. The
WTO sees the role of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) as
follows: "The WTO's procedures for resolving trade quarrels under the
Dispute Settlement Understanding is vital for enforcing the rules and
therefore for ensuring that trade flows smoothly."3 (Emphasis added).
Focusing on the point of "ensuring that trade flows smoothly," the DSU
is characterized by many opportunities for conciliation. Indeed, conciliation and good offices are arguably the guiding force of the DSU. It is
only when and if disputes go before a dispute panel that a formal litigation-like process begins. It is at that stage that questions about the rules
used by panels to hear not only the parties, but other interested parties,
and to open the proceedings up to create some transparency, become an
issue. 4
Disputes arise when a member government believes another member
government is violating an agreement or a commitment that it has made
3.
Statement on the WTO website November 2,2005,
<www.wto.orglenglishltratoP3IdispU3Idispu_e.htm>.
4.
Article 3 of Annex 2 "Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes" [hereinafter "Understanding"] provides:
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and
predictability to the mulitlateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to
preserve the rights and obligations of Memebers under the covered agreements, and to
clarify the existing provision of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of
interpretaion of public intemationallaw. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements."
(Emphasis added).
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in the WTO. The complaint is brought on behalf of a government
against another government, using the auspices of the DSB. While the
procedures before a dispute panel and the appeal process do resemble
court hearings, the emphasis is on the resolution of the dispute between
the parties. The first stage requires consultation or mediation between
the governments concerned, and, even when a dispute has escalated to
"litigation," consultation and mediation may always be invoked. The
priority on settling disputes to ensure that "trade flows smoothly" is reflected in the actual disposition of cases. By July 2005, only about 130
of the nearly 332 disputes had reached the full panel process. Most of
the rest have either been disposed as settled or remain in a prolonged
consultation phase - some since 1995.5 Article 7 of the Understanding
provides:
. .. The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a
positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to
the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred. In the absence of a mutually
agreed solution, the first objection of the dispute settlement
mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures
concerned ....
It is the DSB which has the authority to rule on a dispute. It establishes
panels, adopts (or rejects) panel and Appellate Body reports, and reviews
compliance with its rulings. The "court" phase of a proceeding resulting
in a "ruling" are the panel hearings and panel reports, which mayor may
not be adopted by the DSB.
Dispute resolution can proceed relatively quickly, within less than a year
and a half. The WTO summarizes the time lines as follows:

5.
World Trade Organization data as of November 3, 2005, at
<www.wto.orglenglishlthewto_e?whatis_e?displ_e.htm> "Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes."
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Consultations, mediation, etc.
Panel set up and panelists appointed
Final panel report to parties

6 months
3 weeks

Final panel report to WTO members

60 days

Dispute Settlement Body adopts report (if no appeal)

Total = One year (without appeal)

60-90 days
30 days

Appeals report

Dispute Settlement Body adopts appeals report

Total= 1 year, 3 mos. (with appeal).6
A separate standalone arbitration alternative is also provided in Article
25. The provisions relating to the composition of panels; the ability of
third party members to intervene; how information comes before the
panels and the role of the Secretariat of the WTO are those that most
affect the conduct of the "litigation" aspect of the DSU.
Panels are composed of three panelists. 7 Costs of the panelists are met
from the WTO budget, not the parties to a dispute. 8 Article 8, Section 1
provides that panels "shall be composed of well-qualified governmental
and/or non-governmental individuals, including persons who have served
on or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative [to a trade
agreement], taught or published on international trade law or policy, or
served as senior trade policy official of a Member."9 Panel selection
should be "with a view to ensuring the independence of the members, a
sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience."10
6.
Article 4 provides for consultations; Article 5 for good offices, conciliation and mediation;
Article 6 for establishment of panels; Article 7 for terms of reference of panels; Article 8 for composition of Panels; Araticle 9 for procedures of multiple complainants; Article 10 procedures for muliple complainants; Article 10 for third parties; Articles 11 through 14 and 18, for panel procedures;
Article 15 for review of the draft panel report by the parties; Article 16 for adoption of panel reports
by the DSB; Article 17 for appellate review; Article 19 for panel and appellate body recommendations for compliance with the Agreement ( if non-compliance found); Article 20 the time frame for
DSB decisions; Article 21 for surveillance for compliance with DSB recommendations; and Article
22 for compensation or suspension of trade concessions to cure violations.
7.
Art. 8., Sec. 5.
8.
Art. 8., Sec. II.
9.
Emphasis added.
10.
Art. 8, Sec. 2.
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Citizens of parties to a dispute may not serve on panels, unless all parties
agree. The Secretariat controls the membership of panelists. Panelists
are drawn from lists maintained by the Secretariat, consisting of those
who have heard disputes under GATT and other trade agreements.
Members can suggest new panelists "for inclusion on the ... list, providing relevant information on their knowledge of international trade and of
the sectors or subject matter of the covered agreements."l1 Names are
added upon the approval of the DSB. 12 Thus the composition of the list
of available panelists consists only of trade officials, scholars or experienced counsel. There is no provision within the DSB for inclusion of
those with any other expertise in the list of panelists.
Once serving on panels, panelists "shall serve in their individual capacities and not as government representatives, nor as representatives of any
organization. Members shall therefore not give them instructions nor
seek to influence them as individuals with regard to matters before a
panel."13 If a developing country is a party to a dispute and so requests,
at least one panelist shall be from a developing country.
Disputes raised by one member against another can be joined by other
members, but not by outside third parties. Only member nations in the
WTO may be parties to disputes. 14 Panels review written submissions of
the parties, rebuttal submissions and oral argument. 15
Article 13 provides that panels may seek information, but not that third
parties may submit information, such as amicus briefs, to the panels.
Article 13, Sec. 1 provides: "Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any individual or body which it
deems appropriate." When a panel seeks information from within the
jurisdiction of a member, the member must respond fully and promptly.
Confidential information requested and provided remains confidential.
Article 13, Sec. 2 enables panels to "seek information from any relevant
source and [to] consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects
of the matter. With respect to a factual issue concerning a scientific or
other technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel may request
an advisory report in writing from an expert review group .... " Panel

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Emphasis added.
Art. 8 Sec. 4.
Art. 8 Sec. 9.
Arts. 9-10.
Arts. 12 & 15.
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deliberations are confidential and panel reports are drafted without the
parties'input. Opinions are anonymous. 16
Panels create draft reports which the parties may comment upon in writing. A panel mayor may not revise its report based on these comments.
The panel report is then submitted to the DSB, which considers whether
or not to adopt the panel report. Parties may participate fully in the consideration of the panel report by the DSB. If appeal to the panel report is
filed, consideration of adoption of the panel report is tabled. 17
There may be no ex parte communications with the panel or Appellate
Body. Written submissions to both are treated as confidential and made
available only to parties to the dispute. Parties may, however, disclose
their positions to the public on their own accord. Parties may be required, upon request of any Member to provide non-confidential summaries of written positions that may be disclosed to the public. 18
The Secretariat of the WTO itself can playa key role in the proceedings,
and its staff has played a key, behind-the-scenes, role in dispute resolution. Article 27 provides: "The Secretariat shall have the responsibility
of assisting panels, especially on the legal, historic and procedural aspects of the matters dealt with, and of providing secretarial and technical
support." Members can request assistance from the Secretariat, and developing countries specifically are entitled to "a qualified legal expert
from the WTO technical cooperation services, provided that the "expert
shall assist the developing country Member in a manner ensuring the
continued impartiality of the Secretariat." Finally, the Secretariat shall
conduct special training courses for interested Members concerning the
dispute settlement procedures and practices to enable Members' experts
to be better informed. 19
IV. A BASIC OVERVIEW OF U.S. PROCEDURAL NORMS
UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Little in the dispute resolution procedures resembles U.S. federal court
proceedings. There are no provisions for discovery; disclosures are completely voluntary; and the panels and Appellate Bodies have full authority to seek out witnesses and advisors to assist them in consideration of
the dispute. The veracity of written submissions may not be tested. Interested third parties may not intervene in disputes, although interested
16.
17.
18.
19.

Art. 14.
Arts. 15-16.
Art. 18.
Art. 27.
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members of the WTO may. Submissions by friends of the court may be,
but are not required to be, considered by the panels, Appellate Bodies or
the Dispute Settlement Board itself.
By contrast, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the compulsory disclosure of documents (Rule 34); compulsory answering of
questions propounded by the other party (Rule 33); compulsory testimony of parties (Rule 26); compulsory testimony of non-party fact witnesses (Rule 27); and compulsory examination of premises (Rule 34).
In addition, Rule 24 enables third parties to intervene in an action as of
right when a statute grants such a party the right, or when "the applicant
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest .... " Permissive intervention is also provided
for under Rule 24(b).
Interested parties may also appear at the appellate level in U.S. federal
courts. Rule 37 of the Supreme Court Rules of Practice provides for the
ability of friends of the court to submit briefs both when an application
for hearing is made (writ of certiorari) and to supplement the briefs before oral argument. Rule 37 empowers the Supreme Court to hear information that brings to the attention of the Court relevant information
that is not provided by the parties. Such amici briefs may be submitted
with consent of the parties, or without consent, upon motion to the Court.
It is the practice in many higher courts allover the world to accept amici
briefs, in particular in the intellectual property law field, as has been
shown by the ability of the United States Trademark Association to file
briefs in six different jurisdictions in recent years, including the European Court of Justice.20
These intervention procedures at the trial level and amici brief provisions
at the appellate level provide for the private and public interest in a dispute to be considered in addition to the particular views of the parties.
Discovery procedures enable the bringing to light of evidence that may
be different from that submitted by the parties in support of their own
positions, where such submissions may be admittedly self-serving.

20.
See <www.inta.org/policy/arnicus.html> Nov. 5, 2005. INTA has filed briefs with the
ECl, European Free Trade Association and the Supreme Courts of the U.S., Canada, Indonesia,
Korea and China.
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The role of the panels in hearing disputes follows more closely the model
of the German civil law system in putting the burden on the "judges" the panelists - to collect the facts, and solicit outside opinions. 21 Panelists take a more active role than judges in trial and appellate proceedings
in the U.S. Furthermore, the process of conciliation, in which the panelists take an active role, is more like the role of a civil law judge than a
trial or appellate judge in the common law tradition of the U.S. 22 However, the panels have no teeth. They cannot compel the production of
documents or take testimony, although members must allow agencies or
individuals within their jurisdiction to cooperate with panel requests for
information. 23 Yet there are no "contempt of court" penalties for failure
to comply with requests for information from panels.
The most notable difference between the WTO dispute resolution system
and U.S. civil law procedure is that it is not public. As noted by leading
scholars: "Modem procedural codes stress that judicial proceedings must
be public and that, in principle, the control of the allegations and proof
belongs to the parties."24 Under the WTO dispute resolution system, all
discussions and hearings are confidential, the staff of the Secretariat can
provide its own assistance to the panel and one party, with no possibility
by the other party, or other parties whatsoever, for review. The panelists
and Appellate Bodies may on their own initiative solicit expert opinions
that may affect the outcome of the dispute, but all of these procedures are
secret. The place and date of hearing is not even made public, and the
public may not attend the oral arguments.
This state of affairs has created considerable controversy, particularly
given the position of the WTO DSB as a "Supreme Court" of the WTO.
Very knotty choice of law issues leave open the binding nature of WTO
findings on other courtS.25 However, even if a WTO ruling is not "precedent" that must be followed, nor creates domestic law under a monist
theory, the built-in enforcement power of DSB findings makes the WTO

21.
See the discussion in HORN, KOETZ AND LESER, GERMAN PRNATE AND COMMERCIAL
LAW: AN INTRODUCfION, 45-50 (1982) (cited in GLENDON, GoRDON AND OSAKWE, COMPARATNE
LEGAL TRADITIONS I, 168-173, (2d. ed. 1994)).
22.
See discussion of the role of the Gennan law judge, ibid.
23.
Article 13 Right to Seek Infonnation, Section 1 provides: "Each panel shall have the right
to seek infonnation and techincal advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate. . ..
A Member should respond promptly and fully to any request by a penal for such infonnation as the
panel considers necessary and appropriate."
24.
COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 21, at 166.
25.
M. Bronckers, The Effect of the WTO in European Court Litigation, 40 TEX.INT'L L.J. 443
(2005); Review of J. PAUWELYN, CONFLICf OF NORMS IN PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: How
WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003), reviewed in 98 A.J.I.L 855
(2004).
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the pre-eminent police power in the world today. Its decisions can and
do have far-reaching effects.
V.

WTO DISPUTES INVOLVING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

To date 21 disputes involving intellectual property have been filed with
the WTO, but only five of the proceedings have gone to panel decisions
that have been adopted by the DSB. The remainder have been settled by
the parties. This suggests that the "conciliation" model of WTO disputes
may be working. However, it could also easily suggest that the filing of
disputes has an in terrorem effect so that defendant countries succumb
when disputes are brought against them. The fact that the single largest
economy in the world today, the U.S., is by far the majority complainant
may suggest the latter.
The United States has been the most active jurisdiction in lodging complaints in the WTO for failure to comply with TRIPS obligations. The
U.S. has been the plaintiff in 14 complaints against the following nations:
1. Denmark: measures affecting the enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, DS 83;
2. European Community: enforcement of intellectual property
rights for motion pictures and television programs, DS 124;
3. Greece: Enforcement of intellectual property rights for motion pictures and television program, DS 125;
4. Sweden: measures affecting the enforcements of intellectual
property rights, DS 86;
5. Argentina: certain measures on protection of patents and test
data, DS 196;
6. Argentina: patent protection for pharmaceuticals and test data
protection for agricultural chemicals, DS 171;
7. Brazil: patent protection, DS 199;
8. Canada: patent term protection, DS 170;
9. Denmark: measures affecting the enforcement of intellectual
property rights DS83;

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol12/iss1/11
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Turkey: taxation of foreign film revenues, DS 43;

11.

Japan: measures concerning sound records, DS 28;
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12. European Community: measures affecting the grant of
copyright and neighboring rights, DS 115;
13. Ireland: measures affecting the grant of copyright and
neighboring rights, DS 82 (companion to DS 115); and
14. European Community: trademarks and geographical indications, DS 174 (joined by Australia).
The second most active plaintiff in the WTO involving violations of
TRIPS is the European Economic Community (EC). It has filed 4 disputes against the following jurisdictions:
1. United States: alleging non-compliance of the Fairness in
Music Licensing Act with TRIPS, DS 160;
2. Japan: measures concerning sound recordings DS 42 (companion to U.S. action DS 28);
3. Canada: pharmaceutical patents, DS 114; and
4. India: patents, DS79.
The remaining IP-based disputes have been brought by the following
nations:
1. Canada against the EC based on patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, DS 153;

2. Brazil against the U.S. based on the United States patent
code, DS 224; and
3. Australia against the EC based on trademarks and geographical indications, DS 290 (companion to DS 174 brought by the
U.S.).
The five which have actually been litigated were against the following
nations and raised the following issues:
1. India: Existence of Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, WTIDS50/ABIR. Appellate
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Body Report adopted by the DSB on January 16, 1998, where
the issue was the adequacy of the administrative process in India
to preserve the rights of patent applications until the subject matter became patentable under the phase-in of rights in 2005;
2. Canada:

Length

of

Term

of

Patent

Protection,

WTIDSI70/ABIR, Appellate Body Report adopted by the DSB

on October 12, 2000, where the issue was the conflict regarding
length of patent term under Canadian law pre-TRIPS and TRIPS
patent term length;
3. Canada: "Regulatory Review Exemption" for Patents,
WTIDS114IR Panel Report adopted by the DSB on April 7,
2000, where the issue was whether the Canadian "Regulatory
Review Exception" was consistent with the "limited exceptions"
to the substantive requirement of TRIPS;
4. United States: Exemption from Liability for Certain Performances of Musical Works WTIDSI60IR, Panel Report
adopted by the DSB on July 27, 2000, where the issue was
whether the Fairness in Music Licensing Act exempting from liability small business owners who broadcast music and audiovisual works was consistent with the "limited exceptions" to the
substantive requirement of TRIPS, and
5. E.U.: Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WTIDSI74IR, Panel Report
adopted by the DSB on March 15, 2005, where the issue was
whether national treatment standards were violated by a geographical indicator registration scheme open only to members of
the E.U.
The United States itself was the defendant in a celebrated dispute
brought by the European Community testing the compliance with TRIPS
of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 17. U.S.C. Section 110(5), discussed briefly below.
The United States has filed over half of the 21 disputes involving intellectual property rights issues that have been brought before the WTO.
One of the most notorious cases to actually reach decision is one in
which the U.S. was the defendant and lost. The notoriety stemmed from
the fact that copyright owners opposed the Act, it was criticized as being
non-compliant with TRIPS, and was still enacted, in a sleight of hand
legislative maneuver, which linked the Act to a more popular piece of
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legislation. The day that the Fairness in Music Licensing Act became
law in January 1999, the EC initiated DS 160, alleging that the Fairness
in Music Licensing Act, an amendment to the U.S. Copyright Act, violated Article 13 of TRIPS.
Article 13 provides: "Limitations and Exceptions. Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases
which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder." 17
U.S.c. Section 110(5) expanded the "home style" exemption. The
home-style exemption originally exempted from infringement performances involving "home style" type sound systems used to play music or
broadcast audiovisual works. The paradigm was a radio played at a hot
dog stand, or a television played behind a bar. The playing of such music or audiovisual programming was not considered a "public performance" which would infringe the rights to perform the music or audiovisual works. As revised by the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, Section
110(5) exempted a broad category of performances so that performances
in all premises of 2,000 feet or less with up to six loudspeakers and four
televisions (or similar devices) up to 55 inches were exempt, and performances in bars and restaurants were exempt in truly huge spaces - up
to 3,750 square feet, with the same number and type of speakers or televisions.
The dispute panel found that the provisions of Section 110(5) too broadly
exempted a large class of performances of musical compositions from
infringement and thus "prejudiced the legitimate interests of the right
holder." The DSB adopted the decision of the panel in July 2000. Mter
adoption of the panel report, the U.S. did not appeal and thus became
obligated to repeal the Act "within a reasonable period of time."26 The
parties could not agree on a reasonable period of time be, so this issue
was submitted to arbitration. The second decision in the case was issued
by the arbitrators in January 2001, giving the United States until July
2001 to repeal the legislation. Just as the deadline approached, the EC
agreed to an extension until December 31, 2001.
While the deadline to bring its law into compliance with TRIPS was
pending, the parties began another arbitration to determine the value of
the harm from the failure of the U.S. to comply with TRIPS obligations
from inception. The parties disputed how the valuation of the loss
should be calculated. The EC contended that its music publishers and
26.

Art. 21, Sec. 3.
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songwriters were losing almost $25.5 million a years in royalties, while
the U.S. contended that only $773,000 a year or less was lost. In the
third decision in the case, the arbitrators on November 9, 2001 issued
their ruling that the compensation should be $1.1 million a year. The
arbitrators allegedly could not obtain all of the exact data necessary for
making their calculations, and the parties themselves had quite different
methods of calculations. Estimates had to be and were made, although
the U.S. and the EC could not agree on the proper figures for the estimates. 27
When the deadline to repeal the Act to comply with TRIPS came and
went on December 2001, the arbitrator's decision did not become a
"judgment." Instead the EC was entitled under Article 22.2 to seek compensation, and if this could not be agreed upon, to seek authorization
from the DSB to "suspend concessions" or other obligations. The EC
did not appeal the arbitrators' decision, and apparently the U.S. paid the
$1.1 million per year for the years up to 2001, and has paid ever since,
out of the general fund. Had compensation not been made, under Article
22.3(a), the EC could have retaliated against the U.S. by suspending concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector as that in
which the panel has found a violation or other impairment. For example,
the EC could have stopped the payment of royalties for the performance
of U.S. copyright owners' works in the EC. If this is not" practicable or
effective," under Article 22.3(b) the complaining party can suspend concessions or other obligations in other sectors. In this case, U.S. songwriters and music publishers lobbied against the Act and had no interest
in its passage. Their interests were aligned with those of the E.C. songwriters and music publishers. Thus failure to pay royalties could well
not be "effective." Instead, payments on copyright royalties, or even
trademark royalties in other sectors could have been suspended. 28
In fact, U.S. compliance with TRIPS was doomed from the beginning.
Representative Sensenbrenner, who drafted the legislation that eventually
became enacted as the "Fairness in Music Licensing Act" at the behest of
small business owners, and who had been advised that it would not be
TRIPS compliant, pushed the bill through anyway. Then, when the inevitable happened - the EC won - a Sensenbrenner spokeswoman told
the Hollywood reporter that the Fairness in Music Licensing Act "is U.S.
Law, and allowing an international body to say, 'You will change the

27.
28.

ENTERTAINMENT LAW REpORTER (Nov. 2(01).
ENTERTAINMENT LAW REPORTER (Nov. 2(01), statements of ASCAP, BMI and the RIAA.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol12/iss1/11

14

Hiaring: Fish or Fowl?

2006]

FISH OR FOWL?

283

law,' is not a good precedent to set."29 Moreover, in 2001, Representative Sensenbrenner was Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, the
very committee with jurisdiction to oversee a change to the law. Representative Sensenbrenner also allegedly wrote to the U.S. Trade Representative, taking the position that the DSB ruling notwithstanding, the Act
was TRIPS compliant. 30
The outcome of the case, where the U.S. simply paid its way out after
extensive litigation suggests, at a minimum, that U.S. politics and international treaty obligations can conflict, but also that a double standard
exists where the "have" nations, such as the U.S. and EC can spend large
sums in WTO litigation and, even after a ruling, ignore it, and instead
buy their way out.
The ramifications of DS 160 will be discussed more fully below, after a
brief discussion of the criticisms that have been brought against the DSB
in general, outside the context of intellectual property disputes.
VI. WHAT IS AT STAKE
Numerous scholars have commented upon the shortcomings of WTO
dispute resolution proceedings and their inability, as presently constituted, to accommodate minority views, or the views of civil society, particularly with respect to environmental disputes. These criticisms have
the same validity with respect to disputes that may arise involving use of
patented pharmaceuticals, or, involving first world concerns, disputes
over access to and fair use of, DMCAIWIPO Copyright Treaty - protected content, which could become part of the TRIPS regime. Some of
these criticisms are exemplified in DS 160, concerning the Fairness in
Music Licensing Act.
The critics of the WTO dispute resolution system note the following perceived shortcomings:
A.

THE INABILITY OF PRIVATE PARTIES -Noos, OR OTHER "NONSTATE ACTORS" To PARTICIPATE IN THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROCESS.

Only WTO members can invoke dispute settlements under the DSU. 31
This fact has kept important policy considerations from being heard,
29.
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Nov. 10-12,2001 at 8, cited in ENTERTAINMENT LAW REPORTER
(Nov. 2(01).
.
30.
[d.
31. Arts. 3,9 & 10.
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particularly in the environmental law field, and has raised serious concerns in the public about the legitimacy, fairness and authority of the
WTO. 32 As we have seen from review of the DSU, private parties such
as individuals, corporations or NGOs may not intervene. "Who has a
meaningful voice in the dispute systems ... is in part a question about the
role of developing states at the WTO. But it is also a question about
whether civil society can participate in WTO dispute resolution."33
As there is no process for intervention, there is also no formal provision
for consideration of amicus briefs, although the Appellate Body of the
WTO ruled that WTO panels may, but are not required to, consider
amicus briefs. In United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products (WTIDS58/ABIR, dated Oct. 12, 1998), the Appellate Body determined that amicus briefs by environmental NGOS could
be examined with "substantial discretion."34 Professor Dunoff notes that
the Appellate Body permitted the practice of parties appending amicus
briefs to their own and thus "adopting" the NGO amicus view as their
own. However, absent express "adoption," which has only occurred in
the Shrimp Turtle case by the United States and the adoption of amicus
briefs by the EC in the Asbestos case, amicus briefs have not been considered by panels. 35
B.

THE WTO MANDATE To PROMOTE TRADE DISTORTS FINDINGS
THAT AFFECT OTHER AREAS.

The mandate of the WTO is to promote free trade over all other considerations. This mandate is not necessarily suited to determine development, environmental, labor, health, intellectual property or other issues
that are directly affected by reports issued by WTO panels and adopted
and implemented by the DSB. 36 As one scholar notes,

32.
J. Ragosta, Unmasking the WTO- Access to the DSB System: Can the WTO DSB Live Up to
the Moniker 'World Trade Court'?, 31 LAW & POLICY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 739 (2000),
review by Lori Wallach in 31 LAW & POL'y INTEL'L Bus. 773 (2000); D.C. Esty, NonGovernmental Organizations at the World Trade OrganiZJltion: Co-operation, Competition or Exclusion, I J. INT'L ECON L. 123, (1998); J.L. Dunoff, The Misguided Debate Over NGO Panicipation at the WTO, I J.INT'L ECON. L 433 (1998).
33.
J.L. Dunoff, The WTO's Legitimacy Crisis: Reflections on the Law and Polictics of WTO
Dispute Resolution, 13 AM REV.INT'L ARB. 197, 198 (2002).
34.
A. Dukgeun, review of Ernst-Ulrich Peters mann, International Trade Law and the
GATTIWTO Di.>pute Settlement System, (1997) 20 MICH. J.INT'L L 413 n.13 (1999).
35.
Dunoff, supra note 33. See discussion of adoption of amicus briefs by the U.S. in Shrimp
Turtle, and by the EC in the Asbestos dispute, WTIDS58 (Oct. 12, 1998) and European Communities
- Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Contaiing Products, WTIDS 135 (Sept. 18, 2(00).
36.
Kim Van Der Borght, review of David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade OrganiZJltion (1999),94 A.J.I.L. 427 (2000).
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[I]ndeed, though the DSU is efficient and effective in its own
terms, it was designed primarily as a means of promoting WTO
goals, not as a means of addressing the multitude of conflicting
values and goals that are at stake in, and affected by, WTO actions under the DSU. Moreover, neither governmental nor nongovernmental organizations can invoke the authority or seek the
assistance of any other equivalent third party dispute settlement
system to protect their interests, values, or programs against the
trade-based incursions of the WTO dispute settlement system. 37
At bottom, the conflict is between economic and non-economic values. 38
The sole prerogative of the WTO is to address "free trade," economic
issues, which is arguably too narrow a focus.
C.

THE "DIPLOMATIC" CONCILIATORY ApPROACH FAILS IN A
"LmOATION" CONTEXT

As seen above, the DSU is characterized by many opportunities for conciliation, mediation, arbitration and good offices. It has been noted that
this approach stems from the diplomatic culture out of which the DSU
springs, and the diplomats who populate the Secretariat, the panels, the
appellate body and the DSB itself. What was perceived as an advantage
in the context of reaching a settlement of disputes in a behind-the-scenes,
private diplomatic set of meetings, takes on the flavor of secrecy, lack of
access, lack of due process, paternalism and arbitrary decision-making
when interested third parties with legitimate interests in the outcome of a
dispute that has reached the panel hearing level cannot participate. 39
Many commentators have noted that a shift in the self-image of the DSB
and Secretariat itself is needed so that the diplomatic ethos does not continue to obscure and perpetuate the appearance of illegitimacy of the
WTO process.40 In other words, it must be realized that the panel disputes are global adversarial battles with consequences reaching far beyond the particular dispute between the actors. This is litigation on a
world stage, whose outcome probably has more effect than the outcome
37.
ld.
38.
Dunoff, supra note 33, at 199.
39. J .. L. Dunoff, The WTO' s Legitimacy Crisis: Reflections on the Law and Polictics of WTO
Dispute Resolution, 13 AM. REV.INT'L ARB. 197 (2002), a review of J.H.H. WEILER, THE RULE OF
LAWYERS AND THE ETHOS OF DIPLOMATS: REFELCTIONS ON THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
LEGITIMACY OF WTO DISPUTE REOLUTION (2002).
40.
ld. See also the criticism from the environmental protection and sustainable development
standpoint, e.g. Steve Chamovitz, Opening the TWO to Nongovernmentallnterests, 24 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 173 (2000); Daniel D. Esty, Non-Governmental Organaizations at the World Trade Organaization: Cooperation, Competition or Exclsuion, I J. ENT'L ECON. L. 123 ( 1998).
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of any other litigation in any other forum. As one commentator notes:
"There is no excuse for conducting judicial proceedings, which panel
hearings are supposed to be, in camera."41
D.

COMPETENCY AND BIAS ISSUES

Those who actively assist in the presentation of government disputes
before the WTO are concerned about the ability of the WTO Secretariat
itself, the Appellate Body and the hearing panels to do their job. The
issues involved in any dispute are necessarily complex to resolve within
whatever industry is affected - steel production, refining processes, hormones in food, to name a few. Senior trade officials or jurists who have
made it on the "list" or who have secured WTO sinecures are not necessarily qualified. Furthermore, issues of bias arise when citizens of member states that face identical measures as those raised by the dispute are
impaneled.
E.

NON-REVIEWABLE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MEANING OF THE
WTO AGREEMENTS

Finally, the Secretariat has apparently taken on the task of filling in lacunae in interpretation of various Agreements that make up the WTO.
Such interpretations and findings are without review and without any
accountability to the Members who drafted the Agreements to begin
with. The notion is therefore for a process to refer ambiguities back to
the Members themselves for deterrnination. 42 .
VIT. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROCESS IN GENERAL AFFECT INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW DETERMINATIONS IN PARTICULAR
Particularly in cases where governments are not likely to present minority views, or where governments are forced to take a minority view because of political considerations, the DSU as currently constituted could
wreak havoc with intellectual property policy.
A.

THE No OUTSIDE PARTICIPATION ISSUE

DS 160 is a good example. In that case, legislation that was unpopular
with copyright owner songwriters and music publishers was nevertheless
enacted in the U.S. No NGO, even powerful interests such as the Re41.
2001).
42.

Alan. W. Wolff, Problems with WTO Dispute Resolution, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 417, 422 (
[d.
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cording Industry of America or the large collection societies, ASCAP
and BMI, could present its views to the panels and arbitrators hearing the
important issues raised in OS 160. The U.S. government view, as represented by the U.S. Trade Representative, was in many sectors, including
among copyright scholars, an unpopular view. But these entities had no
representation in the dispute.
B.

THE ONLY POLICY CONSIDERATION IS "FREE TRADE"

In OS 160, the decision-makers had to decide whether a right granted
under TRIPS was impaired by domestic legislation of a member state.
The panel decided that the right impaired was based on an economic
analysis. However, in other instances, the right could be one of fair use,
fair access to copyrighted works, or fair access to other protected subject
matter, such as patented pharmaceuticals, and may not rest on a purely
economic basis. Instead, other policies, such as the policy underlying the
dissemination of ideas, and human rights to life, may be implicated
which are not part of a "free trade" focus.
C.

"CONCILIATION" IN A "LITIGATION" WORLD

Virtually no commentator supports the continuation of the OSU system
as presently constituted which has no formal processes for discovery of
some sort, no requirement to comply with party or panel requests for
information, or any other aspect of U.S. civil procedure which has come
to be so important as to be synonymous with due process. For example,
in DS 160 the very conciliation and arbitration process in which neither
party could agree to a reasonable time table for U.S. compliance, or to an
actual level of damages, leads to a lack of faith in the ability of the system to reach a fair result. The damages phase of OS 160 is particularly
instructive. The arbitrators could not get the information that they
wished, and neither party had any opportunity to question the experts or
their assumptions underlying the claim of damages.
O.

COMPETENCY AND BIAS ISSUES

No facts in OS 160 suggest any bias on the part of any decision-makers
in this proceeding, nor any problems with competency. This does not
mean that these issues could not come up, as the process of selecting
panelists and arbitrators does not suggest any particular expertise in intellectual property issues.
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FINDINGS OF THE SECRETARIAT THAT ARE NOT REVIEWABLE

No issues about the DSU process itself or the methods applied were
raised in DS 160 and decided unilaterally by the Secretariat. Again,
however, this does not mean that this could not happen in the future,
particularly in areas such as the application of Article 22 having to do
with the suspension of concessions or other obligations with respect to
the same sector as that in which a panel or arbitration board has found a
violation or impairment. The Secretariat could be left, for example, to
decide what compensation would not be paid in retaliation for failure to
comply with TRIPS. In DS 160, a suspension of royalties to U.S. songwriters and music publishers would be the closest "sector." But nothing
in the wording of Article 22. 3 defines this, and payments for software
royalties could also arguably fall within the same "sector" since they also
involve copyright royalties.
VIII. CONCLUSION.
The ability to resolve trade disputes using the DSU undoubtedly has its
benefits. The ability to enforce intellectual property law rights by using
the DSU also arguably has its benefits. However, the particular procedures of the DSU should be modified to prevent unintended results that
could affect intellectual property law policy, and to serve the interests of
all stakeholders, not just those represented by the member nations who
are parties to disputes. Unpopular laws can be enacted by minorities and
take on a world significance. The checks and balances of certain of the
civil procedure methods used in U.S. procedure could greatly aid the
finders of fact in DSU proceedings and create greater trust in the methods of the DSU itself.
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